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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to propose a more efficient and accurate distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attack detection mechanism that detects DDoS attacks by monitoring the incoming traffic on the edge routers of ISP
networks. It can be implemented as a module or agent function on the machine that is responsible for processing router
traffic. The detection algorithm works by monitoring the traffic passing through the edge routers and identifying the
occurrence of DDoS attacks or flash events. The algorithm calculates different values like the normalized router entropy,
packet rate, and entropy rate and compares them against the preidentified threshold values to detect the happening of a
DDoS attack or flash event. The threshold values used in the algorithm are evaluated offline by taking the sample attack
and the legitimate traffic flows. The proposed detection mechanism can be implemented on the edge routers of the ISP
networks. ISPs are selected for the deployment of attack detection because the customer networks are directly connected
with them. The effectiveness of the algorithms can be validated mathematically using a sample test bed containing
realistic internet topology. The results clearly indicate that the proposed detection mechanism does effective detection
with a high detection rate and fewer false positives.
Key words: DDoS attacks, DDoS defense, entropy, threshold, internet service providers

1. Introduction
Denial of service attacks can prevent legitimate users from using a particular network, service, or resource. The
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack works by flooding a particular network or web server with a large
number of attack packets. The DDoS attack is a more organized large-scale attack on a particular web server
or network and can make it unavailable to its intended users [1,2]. This attack can be performed indirectly
with the help of many intermediate compromised machines on the Internet. Recently there is an additional
type of Internet traffic, together with DDoS attacks, that is getting popular among people focusing on security
research: a flash event. A flash event is similar to a DDoS attack wherein thousands of legitimate users try to
access a particular network resource such as a web server simultaneously [3]. In some situations, DDoS attacks
and flash events occur simultaneously and it becomes difficult to distinguish between the two.
The proposed attack detection method is an extension of the work on a collaborative agent-based model
for a distributed defense model against DDoS attacks in ISP networks proposed by us in [4]. The attack
detection method proposed here uses entropy and threshold values to identify between legitimate traffic, attack
traffic, and flash traffic. The entropy of flow remains stable in the absence of a DDoS attack or a flash event, but
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when a DDoS attack or flash event happens, the flow of entropy drops because the attack flow or flash traffic
dominates the traffic on the router. The defense system can take advantage of this feature to raise the alarm
as soon as the flow entropy decreases significantly. Attack detection is normally the initial step of any DDoS
defense mechanism. The proposed threshold-based attack detection method can detect DDoS attacks or flash
events on the edge routers of the source networks. The main advantage of the detection method is that it can
be implemented as a part of an agent and can be used for the characterization of incoming traffic. An agent is
a software program, which can work on behalf of Internet service providers and can monitor the traffic heading
towards a particular destination [5]. The agent can be put on the edge router of ISP networks. The edge routers
of ISP networks are chosen for the deployment of agents because the early detection of attack traffic will help
to reduce collateral damage. The attack detection mechanism analyzes the incoming traffic on the edge routers
and identifies suspicious traffic. The identified suspicious traffic can later be confirmed as being a DDoS attack
or not. The traffic that is confirmed as a DDoS attack can be dropped so as to avoid it reaching its target.
The proposed attack detection algorithm is the first, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, that can be used
as an agent-based distributed attack detection and mitigation system. This method can help ISPs secure their
customer networks and provide them with uninterrupted service.
2. Related work and background
Much research on DDoS defense mechanisms has been done in the literature and a variety of defense mechanisms
have been developed. Entropy has been widely used as a metric for measuring the randomness of distributions
and DDoS attack detection. Initially, some methods from the literature that use entropy as a feature for attack
detection are summarized and how they help in attack detection will be discussed.
2.1. Related work
Liu et al. [6] suggested a flow and reputation-based defense system that can be put on the border router of
an organization network. The authors extracted the essential features of the latest DDoS attack traffic and
identified the targets that are under attack, then collected the credit for each flow from microlevel views. The
probabilistic drop technique can be used to filter the DDoS traffic.
Yu and Zhou [7] suggested entropy-based methods for collaborative detection of the DDoS attacks on
community networks. The authors used the entropy feature to measure the randomness of flow in a given router.
Qin et al. [8] identified a new approach for entropy-based DDoS attack detection. This method is divided into
two parts. The first part builds the normal models using the clustering algorithm after having selected some
representative features of DDoS, and the second part identifies abnormalities in the monitored traffic based on
the normal traffic models.
Lee and Xiang [9] suggested the use of different information theoretic measures such as entropy, conditional entropy, relative conditional entropy, information gain, and information cost for anomaly detection.
These measures can be used to describe the characteristics of an audit dataset and suggest the appropriate
anomaly detection models. Bhandari et al. [10] proposed a destination address entropy-based detection and
trace back mechanism against DDoS attacks. It calculates entropy on the basis of the destination address of
the flows. The six-sigma method is used for computing the threshold values. The suggested technique does not
enforce an extra burden on the routers. Additionally, the trace back will not put any marking overhead on the
routers. The technique can be deployed as a separate module on the different routers of the network. However, this method is unable to identify and trace back DDoS attacks that are isotropic in nature. The concept
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of generalized entropy described in [11] is used to discover the connection between the port numbers and the
source/destination IP addresses. It was identified that there is a high correlation between the source/destination
port numbers in legitimate traffic, but no strong correlation among the source/destination IP addresses and the
ports in the attack traffic was found. The authors used several real traffic traces and NetFlow data to certify
their detection method.
Nychis et al. [12] used IP packet header and behavioral features to identify anomalies in traffic flows.
They observed that port and address distributions are highly correlated with each other. This correlation
happens due to the nature of traffic patterns. The anomalies detected by port and address distributions overlap
significantly. These observations have significant implications for entropy-based analysis. The behavior-based
anomaly detection method identified in [13] was used to detect traffic anomalies by comparing the current traffic
features with baseline behavior. It uses maximum entropy and relative entropy to identify traffic anomalies.
Behal and Kumar [14] proposed a novel set of information theory metrics called entropy and divergence metrics
for detecting DDoS attacks and flash events.
David and Thomas [15] proposed an improvement in the detection of DDoS attacks based on a fast entropy
method using flow-based analysis. It is an adaptive threshold-based algorithm that uses both network activities
and user behavior. The network traffic is observed and the fast entropy of requests per flow is calculated. A
DDoS attack is identified when the difference between the entropy of flow count at each instant and mean value
of entropy in that time interval is greater than the threshold value. The threshold value is updated adaptively
based on the traffic pattern condition to improve detection accuracy.
2.2. Preliminaries of information theory
There are many definitions of flow available in the literature [16,17] but we follow the IP Flow Information
Export (IPFIX) working group of the IETF [18]. As per IPFIX, a flow can be defined as a set of IP packets
passing through a monitoring point in a network during a particular time interval. All the packets belonging
to a specific flow have a set of properties. The common sets of properties are source and destination address,
source and destination port, and IP protocol.
Entropy [19] is an information theoretic concept that is used to compute the randomness of the packets
in a flow. It can be used in different ways for the detection of anomalies in traffic features. It is a useful tool
for inspecting the similarity and distribution of a given flow at a router for a particular time interval. When
an attack occurs in the observation window, the entropy of that flow will drop noticeably and we can identify
that situation as a DDoS attack. The value of sample entropy lies in the range [0, log n ]. The entropy shows
its minimum value of 0 when all the flows (IP address or port) are the same and its maximum value of log n
when all the flows are different. The maximum value of n could be 2 32 if one needs to measure the entropy of
unique source and destination IP addresses [20]. Similarly, there could be a maximum n number of ports, and
the maximum value of ports for each protocol could be 65,535. The various values used in the algorithm are
calculated as per the following equations.
2.2.1. Flow entropy
The flow entropy of a random variable X with possible values {x1 , x2 , x3 xn } can be calculated as:
F (xi) = −P (xi) × Log2 (P (xi)),
where P (xi) is the probability of packets belonging to flow (xi) .
1798
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2.2.2. Router entropy
The router entropy at a particular flow can be calculated by combining the entropies of distinct flows (source
IP, dest IP) during time window ∆t:
H=

n
∑

(2)

F (xi),

1

where n is the total number of flows.
2.2.3. Normalized router entropy
The normalized router entropy (NRE) calculates the overall probability distribution of the captured flow for
time window ∆t. It can be calculated as:
H
N RE =
,
(3)
Log2 n
where H is the sum of router entropies during ∆t, and n is the total number of distinct flows at the router.
2.2.4. Packet rate
The packet rate belongs to an average number of packets sent by the source to the destination. The packet rate
for a particular flow in a given time window can be calculated as:
P rt(xi) =

Total number of packets belonging to f low (xi)
,
n

(4)

where n is the total number of captured flows in time window ∆t.
2.2.5. Entropy rate
The entropy rate is used to measure the growth rate of the entropy of any random process. For a series of n
random variables, the entropy rate E R of a stochastic process (xi) is calculated as:
n
∑

ER (x) =

H(xi)

1

n

,

(5)

where n = total number of captured flows in the time window ∆t
The flow entropy can be calculated by collecting sample packets over a specific time window passing
through an edge router. The normalized router entropy, calculated using flow and router entropy, plays a vital
role in capturing any suspicious activity on the edge router. The packet rate helps in identification of suspicious
flows when there is more than one flow passing through the edge router. Finally, the entropy rate gives us a
confirmation about whether a DDoS attack is happening or not.
3. Proposed attack detection algorithm
The detection algorithm can be deployed on the edge routers of the stub networks. The algorithm running on
edge routers will monitor the flow of incoming traffic using flow entropy as a metric. The flow entropy remains
stable in the absence of an attack, but when an attack happens, the entropy drops radically because of the
domination of a flow on the router. Some assumptions are made in advance and directly used in the design of
1799
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algorithm. Initially, the threshold values to be used in the detection algorithm are identified. The values can
be determined by running extensive simulations on sample flows and monitoring the results in the presence and
absence of attacks. The values should be dynamic, and they will be changed as Internet traffic changes so that
detection accuracy can be improved. The working of the attack detection algorithm along with the algorithms
used to calculate threshold values is described below.
3.1. Assumptions
The following assumptions are made during the design of the threshold and the attack detection algorithm:
i. The attack packets enter the network via a minimum of two routers (edge routers), and their traffic will
merge at the gateway router.
ii. The threshold values calculated using Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 are directly used in the detection algorithm.
iii. The values of the sampling period (T) and the time window size ( ∆t) are taken as 10 s and 1 s, respectively.
iv. The cooperation between the edge and gateway routers is necessary to perform attack detection.
v. The detection algorithm can be implemented as a part of the defense agents on the edge and gateway
routers.
3.2. Threshold identification
The threshold values to be used in the detection algorithms need to be identified first. The threshold value
T1 is used to detect a suspicious flow on the edge router. It can be calculated by constructing a sample flow
of legitimate traffic and calculating the normalized router entropy. The value of normalized router entropy is
recorded for the specific time window. The same process is also repeated for attack traffic. There is a difference
in the values of normalized router entropy for legitimate and attack traffic.
Algorithm 1 Identification of threshold value T1.
Step 1: Initialize sampling time T and time window ∆t
Step 2: Construct sample flows of legitimate traffic after every ∆t s on edge router
Step 3: Calculate router entropy and normalized entropy for time window ∆ t s
Step 4: Repeat Steps 2 and 3 for attack traffic also
Step 5: Let En(xi) be the normalized entropy for attack traffic and Ea(xi) for attack traffic
Step 6: Record the values of En(xi) and Ea(xi) for different time intervals
Step 7: Create the range of values for attack as well as legitimate traffic
■

Let En (a1, a2) and Ea (b1, b2) be the range of values for legitimate and attack traffic

Where a1 and a2 are the lowest and highest values of the normalized router entropy for legitimate
traffic, b1 and b2 are the lowest and highest values of normalized router entropy for attack traffic
Step 8: Choose appropriate threshold T1 so that it is sufficiently less than a1 and greater than b2
Step 7 of Algorithm 1 shows that a range of highest and lowest values is created for legitimate and attack
traffic. We choose an appropriate value of T1, which is sufficiently larger than the largest value found during
the attack traffic and smaller than the smallest value found during the legitimate traffic.
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Threshold T1 identifies only the happening of suspicious activity but not the suspicious flow. The
threshold value T2 is used to identify the suspicious flow among the flow passing through the router. It can be
calculated by calculating the average packet rate of legitimate and attack traffic during specific time windows.
A range is created by taking average packet rate values for all legitimate and attack traffic. Step 7 of Algorithm
2 helps us decide the appropriate value of threshold T2.

Algorithm 2 Identification of threshold value T2.
Step 1: Initialize sampling time T and time window ∆t
Step 2: Construct sample flows of normal traffic after every ∆t s on one edge router
Step 3: For each flow, calculate packet rate; let it be prt1, prt2,.... prtn
Step 4: Calculate average packet rate; let it be avg1 avg1 =

prt1+prt2+.....prtn
∆t

Here ∆ t is time window

Step 5: Record average packet rate (avg1) values for different time intervals; let this be range1
Step 6: Repeat Steps 2, 3, 4, and 5 for attack traffic and let the average packet rate be avg2 and range be
range2
Step 7: Choose appropriate threshold T2 so that it is sufficiently larger the largest value of range1 and
smaller than the smallest value of range2

After the successful identification of suspicious flow using T2, the next step is to identify threshold value
T3, which is used to confirm whether the suspicious flow is part of a flash event or an attack flow, i.e. a
DDoS attack. T3 can be identified by calculating the entropy rate for the suspicious flow on the edge router.
The downstream gateway router is also called to check the entropy rate for the same suspicious flow for other
upstream edge routers. The difference of entropy rates on the edge and gateway routers is calculated and
recorded for different time intervals. Threshold value T3 could be chosen such that it is sufficiently larger than
the largest value of range3.

Algorithm 3 Identification of threshold value T3.
Step 1: Initialize sampling time T and time window ∆t
Step 2: Construct sample flows of attack traffic after every ∆ t s on two edge Routers, say E1 and E2
Step 3: Calculate entropy rate for attack flow on E1 and E2 using time window ∆ t
Step 4: Calculate difference between entropy rate at E1 and E2; let it be Diff, Diff = |E1 − E2|
Step 5: Record different values of Diff using different time intervals; let this be range3
Step 6: Choose appropriate threshold T3 so that it is sufficiently larger than the largest value of range3

The threshold values play a vital role in the detection algorithm. After their identification, the next
step is to design and discuss the attack detection algorithm. The main task of the detection algorithm is the
identification of suspicious flow and later confirmation of whether the suspicious flow is a DDoS attack or a
flash event on edge routers.
1801
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3.3. Detection algorithm
The detection algorithm works by executing the various steps mentioned in Algorithm 4. Initially, the various
flows passing through the edge router are collected and their flow entropy, router entropy, and normalized
router entropy are calculated for every ∆ t s. Then the value of normalized router entropy is compared against
threshold T1 to identify the occurrence of a suspicious event. If the value becomes less than T1, it indicates
that a suspicious flow is passing through the edge router. Step 9 will identify the suspicious flow by calculating
and comparing the packet rate of all flows against T2. After the successful identification of suspicious flow, the
next step is to identify whether the suspicious flow is an attack flow or just a flash event. Step 10 will calculate
the entropy rate for the suspicious flow on the current edge router. Steps 11 and 12 will be performed on the
gateway router where the entropy rate for the suspicious flow is calculated for the neighboring edge routers.
Steps 13 and 14 will do the confirmation of the DDoS attack by comparing the difference between entropy rates
against threshold T3.

Algorithm 4 DDoS attack detection.
Step 1: Initialize various parameters like time window ∆ t, sampling time T, detection thresholds T1, T2,
and T3
Step 2: Collect traffic after every ∆ t s on edge router
Step 3: Construct flows from the collected traffic in ∆t s
Flow1

Flow2

Flow3

Flow4

···

Flown

Step 4: For each flow, calculate flow entropy using Eq. (1)
Step 5: Calculate router entropy using Eq. (2)
Step 6: Calculate normalized router entropy (NRE) using Eq. (3)
Step 7: Compare NRE against threshold T1
Step 8: If the value of NRE is ≥T1 then treat all flows as legitimate flow; otherwise, if NRE is <T1, then
there is a suspicious flow
Step 9: Identify the suspicious flow and follow the following steps: a) For each flow x(i), calculate packet rate
using Eq. (4) b) If Prt(xi) ≤ T2, then the flow is not suspicious; otherwise, the flow is suspicious
Step 10: To further confirm whether the suspicious flow (xi) is legitimate or an attack, calculate its entropy
rate, E1, using Eq. (5), for the current edge router
Step 11: Message the downstream gateway router to check the entropy rate of the suspected flow (xi) for
other edge routers
Step 12: Calculate the entropy rate of the suspected flow (xi) from other edge routers; let it be E2
Step 13: Calculate the difference between E1 and E2 Dif f = |E1 − E2|
Step 14: Compare the value of Diff with threshold T3, If Diff > T3, then flow = legitimate flow (flash
event) Else flow = attack flow (DDoS attack)
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4. Experimentation
To evaluate the performance of the proposed detection mechanism, a sample test bed reflecting packet movements between an ISP and a server has been designed. The test bed consists of six source nodes, two destination
nodes, four edge routers, two gateway routers. and two core routers. Source nodes A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, and
C2 are connected with edge routers R1, R2, and R3 as shown in Figure 1. Nodes A1, B1, and C1 will act as
attacking nodes in the presence of an attack. The two web servers S1 and S2 are used as destination nodes
connected to edge router R4. The traffic originating from source networks will pass through at least one edge
router before it reaches victim web server S1. The detection algorithm will be deployed on the edge routers
where it monitors and extracts attack traffic from the legitimate traffic.

Figure 1. Topology reflecting transit–stub Internet model for attack detection algorithm.

Figure 1 shows the example topology chosen to prove the effectiveness of the detection algorithm. The
attack traffic originating from nodes A1, B1, and C1 will pass through edge routers R1, R2, and R3 and merge
at gateway router G1, so the defense agents holding the detection algorithm can be put on R1, R2, and R3.
Gateway node G1 will do the confirmation of the DDoS attack.

4.1. Simulation environment
OMNeT ++ [21] along with the INET framework (https://omnetpp.org/doc/inet/api-current/inet-manualdraft.pdf) is used to test the detection algorithm on the example topology given in Figure 1. ReaSE [22]
is an extension of the INET framework, which permits us to produce realistic simulation topologies keeping
multiple aspects of a real-world network such as nodes, traffic patterns, link bandwidth, and attack traffic.
Table 1 depicts the various parameters used in the simulation to test the effectiveness of the proposed attack
detection algorithm.
Figure 2 shows the screenshot of the example topology (as discussed in Figure 1) chosen to prove the
effectiveness of the detection algorithm. The host1(A2), host2(B2), and host3(C2) will act as web clients and
generate HTTP traffic towards the protected web server, server1(S1). Nodes DDoSZombie1(A1), DDoSZombie2(B1), and DDoSZombie3(C1) are used to flood web server server1 with TCP SYN attack packets. The
detection algorithm can be put on R1, R2, and R3 as they pass most of the attack traffic. Gateway node
G1 will do the confirmation of the DDoS attack. The simulation runs for 10 s and the traffic generated from
different nodes is collected in scalar and vector files, which are later converted in the form of datasets.
1803
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Table 1. Basic simulation parameters.

Parameter
Attacker nodes
Legitimate nodes
Web servers
Edge routers (source network)
Edge routers (victim network)
Gateway routers (source network)
Gateway routers (victim network)
Sampling time (T)
Time window (∆T)

Value
3
3
2
3
1
1
1
10 s
1s

Figure 2. Screenshot of example topology for testing detection algorithm.

4.2. Deciding threshold values
The threshold values used in the detection algorithm are identified as per Algorithms 1, 2, and 3. These values
are calculated by measuring flow entropy, router entropy, normalized router entropy, and packet rate using
sample legitimate and attack traffic generated with the help of a simulation.

■

■

■
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Threshold value T1 = 0.90 is a numeric value used to identify the happening of a suspicious flow.

Threshold value T2 = 100 is the number of packets used to identify the suspicious flows among the flows
passing through router.

Threshold value T3 = 0.10 is a numeric value used to confirm whether the identified suspicious flow is a
DDoS attack or flash event.
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4.3. Simulation scenarios
4.3.1. Scenario 1 (DDoS attacks)
In this scenario, we will perform a DDoS attack on destination S1. Nodes A1, B1, and C1 are used to flood
the victim with TCP SYN attack packets. The attack will start at the 3 s and continued for the next 6 s. The
simulation lasts for 10 s. The data generated by the OMNeT ++ simulation are collected in the form of scalar
and vector values. Table 2 shows the legitimate and attack flows (collected from .vec and .sca files, generated
through simulation) and mathematically calculated values of normalized router entropy per flow for routers R1,
R2, and R3.
Table 2. Router entropy of different edge routers during DDoS attacks.

Time (s)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Edge router R1
Flow 2
Flow 1
A2→S1 A1→S1
40
50
20
30
60
300
70
350
75
380
80
400
70
390
90
450
30
40
40
60

NRE
0.99
0.97
0.65
0.64
0.73
0.66
0.65
0.65
0.98
0.97

Edge router R2
Flow 4
Flow 3
B2→S2 B1→S1
30
50
40
45
50
325
40
340
45
370
55
410
70
400
60
430
80
50
40
60

NRE
0.96
0.99
0.56
0.50
0.49
0.52
0.61
0.55
0.97
0.97

Edge router R3
Flow 6
Flow 5
C2→S2 C1→S1
45
40
55
65
60
350
55
380
80
420
70
450
50
400
60
430
70
40
40
30

NRE
0.99
0.99
0.60
0.54
0.63
0.58
0.51
0.53
0.95
0.99

NRE: Normalized router entropy.

Since the number of flows per edge router is 2, the value of log 2 2 will become 1. Hence, as per Eq. (3),
the value of normalized router entropy for each flow will become equal to the value of router entropy. At 3 s the
detection algorithm running on edge router R1 observes that the value of normalized router entropy will become
less than threshold T1, so there is a suspicious flow, which causes the decrease in the normalized entropy value.
Now, to identify the suspicious flow, we have to calculate the packet rate of each flow and compare it against
threshold T2:
Packet rate of flow 2 (A2 →S1) = 60,
Packet rate of flow 1 (A1 → S1) = 300.
The packet rate at t = 3 of flow 1 becomes greater than threshold T2; hence, it will be treated as a
suspicious flow. The flow A1 → S1 (flow 1) is treated as a suspicious flow but to confirm further whether it is
an attack flow, its entropy rate is calculated as:
Entropy rate for the flow A1 → S1 (flow 1) at R1, Ea = 0.22.
The defense agent at R1 asks gateway router G1 to compute the entropy rate for the flow heading towards
protected destination S1 for other upstream edge routers, i.e. R2 and R3. The entropy rate for flow B1 → S1
(flow 3) at router R2 and C1 → S1 (flow 5) at router R3 is calculated as:
1805
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Entropy rate for flow B1 → S1 (flow 3) at R2, Eb = 0.18,
Entropy rate for flow C1 → S1 (flow 5) at R2, Ec = 0.19.
Now we calculate the difference between entropy rates for flow 1 at router R1 and flow 3 at router R2.
This is calculated as:
Diff = Ea – Eb = |0.22 – 0.18 | = 0.04
Similarly, the difference between entropy rates of flow 1 at router R1 and flow 5 at router R3 is calculated
as:
Diff = Ea – Ec = | 0.22 – 0.19 | = 0.03.
Since the value of Diff in both cases is less than threshold T3, flow A1 → S1 (flow 1) is confirmed as an
attack flow (DDoS attack).
4.3.2. Scenario 2 (flash events)
DDoS attack detection becomes more difficult when a very similar situation called a flash event occurs. A flash
event is a situation in which a large number of legitimate users simultaneously access a destination. Flash events
are very similar to DDoS attacks in traffic characteristics. The discrimination between a DDoS attack and a
flash event is very important for any DDoS defense mechanism. In this scenario, we assume all the nodes (as
given in Figure 1) are legitimate users, but there is surge access (similar to a DDoS attack) during the 4th to
6th seconds at router R1. Table 3 shows the calculated values of router entropy per flow for the traced data
after simulations for routers R1, R2, and R3.
Table 3. Router entropy of different edge routers during flash event.

Time (s)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Edge router R1
Flow
Flow 1
A2→S1 A1→S1
40
50
20
30
30
50
70
350
75
380
80
400
70
40
30
40
30
40
40
60

NRE
0.99
0.97
0.96
0.64
0.73
0.66
0.95
0.97
0.98
0.97

Edge router R2
Flow 4
Flow 3
B2→S2 B1→S1
30
50
40
45
70
40
55
70
70
55
60
45
30
50
70
40
80
50
40
60

NRE
0.95
1.00
0.95
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.95
0.95
0.96
0.97

Edge router R3
Flow 6
Flow 5
C2→S2 C1→S1
45
40
55
65
20
30
70
40
30
50
40
60
30
40
40
45
70
40
40
30

NRE
0.99
0.99
0.97
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
0.95
0.99

NRE: Normalized router entropy.

The value of the normalized router entropy on router R3 remains greater than the threshold value T1
during the first seconds, but it will get decreased during the 4th to 6th seconds. At this stage, the detection
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algorithm detects flow A1 → S1 (flow 1) as a suspicious flow and it will be further investigated whether it is an
attack flow (DDoS attack) or legitimate flow (flash event). This can be done by calculating the entropy rate for
flow A1 → S1 (flow 1) on router R1 and correspondingly on routers R2 and R3:
Entropy rate for flow A1 → S1 (flow 1) at R1, let Ea = 0.22,
Entropy rate for flow B1 → S1 (flow 3) at R2, let Eb = 0.47,
Entropy rate for flow C1 → S1 (flow 5) at R3, let Ec = 0.53.
Now calculate the difference between entropy rates of flow one at router R1 and flow three at router R2.
This is calculated as:
Diff = Ea – Eb = | 0.22 – 0.47 | = 0.25.
Similarly, the difference between entropy rates of flow one at router R1 and flow five at router R3 is
calculated as:
Diff = Ea – Ec = | 0.22 – 0.53 | = 0.31.
Since the value of Diff in both cases is greater than threshold T3, flow A1 → S1 (flow 1) is confirmed as
a legitimate flow (flash event).

5. Performance analysis
An attack detection system can detect 100% of DDoS attacks only if it considers a good threshold value. The
identification of a good threshold value to be used in the detection algorithm is one of the challenging tasks for
the researchers. We have already identified the different threshold values to be used in the detection process. If
the T1 value is 0.90, then it will be good for the identification of attacks, but it can produce false positive alerts
as we increase it from 0.95 to 0.99. The effect of the threshold value on the performance of attack detection is
discussed here.
5.1. Effect of detection algorithm on attack packets
Consider Table 2, showing the status of the attack and the legitimate packets from source nodes A1 and A2.
The attack started at the 3 s from node A1 and continued for the next 6 s. The effect of the attack detection
method and the threshold value on the attack and legitimate packets passed by router R1 is discussed here.
Figure 3 shows the effect of the detection algorithm and threshold value on the attack packets detected
and dropped during the attack on router R1. Router R1 passes most of the attack packets in the absence of
the detection algorithm. In the presence of the detection algorithm, the legitimate packets coming from node
A2 will be allowed to pass, but the packets coming from node A1 are identified as attack packets (during the
attack interval, i.e. 3rd to 8th second) as per the threshold value. An appropriate threshold value can thus
identify and drop most of the attack packets.
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Figure 4. Status of packets during flash event at router
R1.

5.2. Effect of detection algorithm on flash events
Table 3 illustrates the happening of a flash event on routers R1 and R2 for 3 s (i.e. during the 4th to 6th
seconds). Figure 4 shows the effect of the detection algorithm on the number of packets passed by router R1 in
the absence and presence of the detection algorithm.
In the absence of the detection algorithm, the router will pass all the packets, but when the detection
algorithm is activated, it detects the happening of abnormal activity during the 4th to 6th seconds and identifies
it as a flash event. The packets belonging to the flash event are also considered as normal packets and router
R1 allows them to pass. Threshold value T3 helps in the accurate identification of the attack and flash packets.

5.3. Detection rate
The detection rate (Rd) is the ratio of the number of attack packets detected by the detection algorithm to the
total number of attack packets generated from different sources. It is measured as:

Rd =

D
,
N

(6)

where D is the number of attack packets detected and N is the total number of attack packets generated.
Ideally, the value of the detection rate should be one. The detection rate highly depends on the threshold
values. If the value is too low, then it will increase the false negatives, i.e. attack packets will be mistakenly
considered as legitimate packets. If the value is too high, then it will increase the false negatives, i.e. the
legitimate packets will be considered as attack packets. The purpose of the detection algorithm is to keep the
detection rate as high as possible.
Figure 5 shows that the detection rate varies with the varying threshold value for edge router R1 as per
Table 2 when an attack is happening from node A1. The detection rate will remain zero if we set threshold
T1 as <60 but if we increase T1 further then the detection rate will also increase. In the current scenario, a
detection threshold T1 of 0.75 is sufficient to detect 100% of the attacks. A detection threshold T1 of 0.90,
chosen by us, is appropriate for the attack detection algorithm.
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5.4. False positive rate
The false positive rate (Rfp) is the ratio of the number of legitimate packets, which are mistakenly detected as
attack packets to the total number of legitimate packets. It is measured as:
Rf p =

P
,
M

(7)

where P is the number of packets detected as attack packets and M is the total number of legitimate packets.
Based on observation of Table 3 for the legitimate traffic at router R2, if we set T1 in the range of 0 to
0.94 then the false positive rate is 0, but if we set T1 in the range of 0.94 to 0.99 then the false positive rate
starts increasing, and for T = 1, the false positive rate will become 100%. Thus, the threshold T1 of value 0.90
chosen by us is appropriate for accurate attack detection. Figure 6 shows the effect of threshold values on the
percentage of legitimate packets detected as attack packets.
The accuracy of the attack detection algorithm will highly depend on the threshold value. Inappropriate
threshold values can cause high false positive and false negative rates. If the value is too high, it produces high
false positives, and if the value is too low, it creates high false negatives. Thus, the threshold values should be
chosen such that they keep false positive and false negative rates as low as possible.
6. Conclusion and future work
The proposed threshold-based attack detection mechanism detects DDoS attacks by monitoring flows on edge
routers. The flow entropy, router entropy, and normalized router entropy are calculated for each flow passing
through the edge router of source networks. If during a particular moment the value of normalized router
entropy for a particular flow goes below a specific threshold, then the flow will be considered as suspicious. The
suspicious flow is then further tested to confirm whether it is an attack flow or legitimate flow. This can be
done by calculating the entropy rate for the suspicious flow on the existing edge router and the gateway router
(for other upstream edge routers). If the difference between entropy rates is less than a given threshold then the
flow is confirmed as a DDoS attack; otherwise, it will be a legitimate flow. The algorithm is tested for varying
threshold values and the results show that the detection algorithms manage to detect more than 97% of attack
packets during the attack. The false positive rate could be reduced to zero and the detection rate can be raised
to 100% under perfect threshold values.
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This paper presents only the first part of the defense model, which detects DDoS attacks in single ISP
networks. Presently, we are exploring a variety of DDoS attacks and modifying this mechanism to suit different
attack scenarios. In the future, we hope to extend this model to prevent DDoS attacks in multiple ISP networks.
That involves the use of a hierarchy, where each ISP can have one controller and several agents. The agents will

0

0.1

0.2

0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Detection threshold (T1)
Detection Rate (%)

0.8

0.9

1

Figure 5. Effect of threshold value on detection rate.
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Figure 6. Effect of threshold value on false positive rate.
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hold this detection algorithm and help in the detection and mitigation of DDoS attacks. The agents further
share attack-related information with their controllers, which further share this information with neighboring
controllers to carry out effective distributed defense.
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